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President Trump’s 2018
Tariffs on Steel
Davis Forster

In the aftermath of the Great Recession, much of the United States working and
middle class found themselves struggling. The factory, manufacturing, and metalworking jobs they had been doing for decades continued to move overseas, where
others could do it cheaper and faster. The US steel industry, in particular, had been
contracting steadily since the 1990s with no signs of stopping, despite several previous government revitalization efforts, such as Bush’s steel tariffs in 2002 (York 2018).
As the 2016 election approached, America’s middle and working classes were looking for someone who would bring their jobs back.
President Donald Trump’s election in 2016 signaled a resurgence of rightwing populism. Still, in contrast to many of his Republican predecessors, President
Trump’s foreign policy was staunchly protectionist and anti-free trade. Throughout
his entire campaign, he proudly proclaimed his intentions to “use every lawful presidential power to remedy trade disputes, including the application of tariffs” (Trump
2018), especially when protecting the American manufacturing sector and its steel.
Only three short months after Trump’s inauguration, the Department of Commerce under Secretary Ross began their investigation to ascertain foreign steel’s
threat to national security (Lawder 2017) under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962. Section 232 allows the Department of Commerce to investigate how imports of particular products affect national security and recommend counteractions
to the president if they deem a product vital to national security (Bureau of Industry and Security 2020). Under this section, the president can take actions he usually
would not have the authority to impose tariffs or restrict imports (Bureau of Industry
and Security 2020). This power has been primarily used to investigate materials like
uranium and crude oil in the past. Both materials play a significant role in the US’s
military power and could cause problems if they were to fall into the wrong hands
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(Bureau of Industry and Security 2020). Under the Bush administration in 2001, the
most recent investigations also investigated the effects of imported semi-finished
steel on national security, much like the investigation under Trump. The Bush Department of Commerce’s found that imported steel posed no threat to US national
security and recommended no action to President Bush (US Dept of Commerce 2001).
On the other hand, Trump’s Department of Commerce came to a different conclusion. According to their investigation, if the US were ever in dire need of steel,
international suppliers could withhold it, crippling the US’s defense and manufacturing capabilities. They presented these findings to President Trump, who took decisive action (Kim 2020). Making good on his campaign promise, President Trump
signed an executive order to enforce a flat 25% tariff on imported steel on March 8,
2018. Usually, Congress has the authority to levy taxes and impose duties, but in
this case, as is increasingly becoming the norm, the president acted independently of
Congress. Citing Section 232, Trump imposed these tariffs through the Department
of Commerce based on a national security emergency (Executive Order 2018). No
President has ever invoked this section to institute a tariff, let alone a tariff on something as vital to the American consumer industry as steel (Kim 2020). Opponents saw
this legal justification as an underhanded loophole that Trump used to circumvent
Congressional opposition, both Republican and Democrat.
This initial executive order featured temporary exclusions for key trade allies
Mexico, Canada, the EU, Brazil, South Korea, Argentina, and Australia. However,
only a few short months after this first executive order, President Trump signed a secondary order that removed this exemption for Canada, Mexico, and the EU. It took
until May 2019 for Canada and Mexico to renegotiate their exclusions. In December
2019, President Trump accused Brazil and Argentina of purposely devaluing their
currencies to cheapen their exports and pursued punitive measures against them,
rescinding their exclusions from the tariff. He later regranted Brazil’s exclusion (Griswold 2019). Trump’s administration also granted exceptions to hundreds of companies on a case-by-case basis (Lardner and Fenn 2019).
Within a year of this tariff, steel prices shot up 38% domestically (Amiti 2019).
Abroad, Trump’s steel tariff inspired retaliatory tariffs from nearly every major power
affected, including China, the EU, India, Mexico, and Canada (Griswold 2019). China
filed an official complaint with the WTO in 2018, citing Trump’s steel tariff alongside
others as violations of the GATT’s rules against discriminatory tariffs (World Trade
Organization 2018a). The European Union and Canada filed similar claims later that
year (World Trade Organization 2018b). The steel tariff also devastated the manufacturing industry and most other industries that use steel as an input, such as the
construction industry and even the agricultural industry (Polansek 2018).
Overall, Trump’s steel tariff contributed to a deterioration of economic relations
with some of our most significant allies. Although the steel industry reaped marginal benefits, prices for manufactured goods within the US soared, pushing jobs in
those industries out of the country (Heather 2018; Amiti 2019). I believe these tariffs
were passed primarily due to the president’s willingness to exploit his legal powers,
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coupled with lobbying from particular steel and labor groups. State structures hindered Congress’s ability to take any action against these tariffs and concentrated decision-making power in a president who was heavily susceptible to the steel industry’s
lobbying.

Why Free Trade?
Before delving deeper into President Trump, his tariffs, and other influencing
factors, it is important to dispel some myths about tariffs and free trade. On the surface, tariffs may seem like an attractive option to bolster the US’s economy. By discouraging the influx of foreign products, one might assume that more people would
purchase US-made products instead. Many see the money spent on imports as wasted money that the US should spend on bolstering domestic industry instead of paid
out to foreign firms and governments. And while tariffs can be used to “help” domestic firms by blocking foreign competition, they always produce an inefficient outcome
(Boudreaux and Ghei 2018). Tariffs may be suitable for the domestic firms they are
protecting, but for consumers, tariffs almost always mean a higher price for goods. If
a protected good (i.e., steel) is used as an input in other goods, the price-raising effect
of a tariff can spread to other industries and products.
Furthermore, tariffs prevent a country from producing the thing they are best at
(or least bad at). In classical economics, this idea is known as comparative advantage.
If countries specialize in the goods they are most efficient at producing, and trade for
the goods they are not, they can operate at a much higher efficiency than if they tried
to produce everything themselves. So even by buying goods from a small country
with a small economy, the US still benefits because it frees up its economy to focus on
the things it does best.
Free trade can also promote domestic growth while keeping economies efficient.
For example, over half of US imports are NOT finished consumer goods but inputs
for other goods (Boudreaux and Ghei 2018). By buying these inputs at a lower price
from other countries, domestic firms enjoy lower input costs and can operate at higher levels. Why, then, are some modern politicians drawn so strongly towards tariffs?
Firstly, tariffs have very strong short-term effects, while the benefits of free trade are
more spread out and harder to identify. Tariffs are also easy to implement: a definite tax on an import is easier than reforming or expanding America’s international
trade policies. Politicians are also responsible to their constituents, which may skew
towards workers in comparatively inefficient domestic industries depending on geographic area. While this explains why many surrounding politicians and actors supported Trump’s tariffs, Trump himself had more personal motives in pushing for
these tariffs.
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President Trump, homo Protectus
Donald Trump, in his heart of hearts, is a businessman. Much of his view on
trade can be explained by his background in the vicious world of New York real estate. Smith and Ricardo are nowhere to be found in his world,, and all deals produce a
winner and a loser. “Mutually beneficial trade” simply is not in Trump’s lexicon, and
for him, making a bad deal or getting cheated is the “ultimate failure” (Schleisinger
2018). I believe this philosophy is also a primary reason that Trump has been consistently protectionist since as far back as the 1980s. Trump’s statements back then read
almost exactly like his campaign slogans today; “A lot of people are tired of watching
other countries ripping off the United States,” he said in 1987. “They laugh at us behind our backs. They laugh at us because of our own stupidity.” (Fisher 2018). Many
see Trump’s protectionism as China-oriented and that our allies just ended up caught
in the crossfire. Still, Trump has clarified that he sees any particularly powerful country as a threat to the US, calling Japan “interchangeable with China, interchangeable
with other countries. But it’s all the same thing” (Trump 2018). When Japan held a
majority stake in the US deficit, he wanted to tax Japanese imports heavily, and now
that China holds that stake, his sights have shifted to them (Schleisinger 2018).
The fact that his steel tariffs hit our allies aligns with his protectionist agenda
as well. Trump sees EVERY country as a trade threat, not just the more traditionally
adversarial ones like China. In attacking NAFTA, a trade deal that linked the US,
Mexico, and Canada, he called it “the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere,
but certainly ever signed in this country” (Trump 2016). So in trade, Trump has always seen the US as “the company” and every other country as a competitor instead
of a partner.
Trump is, and always has been, a protectionist because he sees trade as a fundamentally zero-sum game, where if you are not winning, you are losing. In the world
of international trade, he has always viewed tariffs as the cure-all for trade imbalances and “bad deals” and advocated for harsh tariffs for nearly his entire public
lifetime (Schlesinger 2018). When Trump finally had his hands on the controls as
president, he did exactly what he said he would do decades prior, instituting tariffs
like this steel one.

Congress
These controversial tariffs divided Congress, but not on party lines as one might
expect. Instead, Congress split on regional lines, with Democrats and Republicans
from states with strong steel industries supporting the tariffs (The Associated Press
2018). Most notably, both Nancy Pelosi (Democratic House Minority Leader) and
Paul Ryan (Republican Speaker of the House) released public statements publicly
denouncing the tariffs (Breuninger 2018; Pelosi 2018). Some Democratic senators like
Bob Casey (D-PA), who had called for President Trump’s resignation, applauded
the tariffs. Many Republicans, on the other hand, believing in free trade and open
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markets, vehemently opposed the tariffs. Prior to Trump’s first executive order enacting the tariffs, 107 Republican members of Congress (nearly half of the party’s representation) wrote a letter to Trump, strongly urging him to reconsider (Breuninger
2018).
With Congress so divided, it seemed like Trump’s steel tariffs would not survive,
yet Trump was able to get his steel tariffs and more. How could Trump circumvent
Congress so easily? The answer lies in the state structure of the executive branch and
the office of the president. Trump was able to make shrewd use of an old rule that
had not been invoked since the organizing of the WTO in 1990, Section 232 of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Executive Order 2018). Even in the 26 times it had been
invoked earlier, only two of those instances resulted in legal presidential action (Kim
2020). Where other politicians might have shied away from using such legal loopholes, Trump immediately took advantage of the situation and declared a national
emergency over the US’s steel imports (Kim 2020). In short, Congress underestimated
how far Trump was willing to push the political envelope for these tariffs and found
themselves unable to disarm the president when he used this obscure rule against
them.
So why was Congress unable to fight back effectively? They certainly tried to,
attempting many strategies to remove the president’s authority under Section 232
in the first few months after the tariff’s enactment. Republicans especially, including
senators like Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), and Bob Corker (R-TN), touted
the idea of introducing legislation to limit and amend section 232 (Breuninger 2018).
One such bill is the Bicameral Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, introduced
by Senator Pat Toomy (R-PA), which would limit the president’s power under Sec.
232 (US Congress 2019). After its introduction in January of 2019, the bill was sent to
committee, where it has not been heard from in more than two years (US Congress
2019). Similar bills have suffered the same fate, such as the Trade Security Act of 2019,
the Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act 2019, and the Trade Certainty
Act of 2019 (Sandler 2021). All these bills were introduced to curtail the president’s
authority under Sec 232, and all have stagnated in committee for years since their
inception (US Congress 2019; Sandler 2021).
These bills’ failures illustrate the prominent weakness that prevented Congress
from taking effective action against the president: its inability to mobilize and mobilize quickly. Firstly, the partisan nature of Congress makes it difficult to get enough
votes for bills to even get off the ground in the first place. In this case, Republicans
who opposed Trump’s steel tariff struggled to get any support from Democrats, who
did not care much for free trade in the first place (Schor 2018). The Republican Party
also was not united in its opposition to the president’s protectionism. Certain Republicans, especially those from states specializing in steel, had no qualms with Trump’s
policy (Schor 2018). Congress itself also suffers from collective action problems when
compared to the president. It is much easier and quicker for the president to sign
an executive order or institute a new foreign policy than it is for Congress to write
a bill, send it to the committee, vote again, ad nauseam. This mobilization problem
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ultimately prevented Congress from taking any meaningful counteraction against
President Trump’s steel tariff. One could strongly argue that this is a feature of Congress and not a bug, but when Congress was caught by surprise with Trump’s steel
tariff, their slow speed and bureaucratic nature stopped them dead in their tracks.

Legal Challenges
Several third-party groups also challenged section 232 as a legal basis, most
prominently the American Institute for International Steel (AIIS), a coalition of manufacturers reliant on imported steel (Palmer 2020). This legal battle concluded only
recently in June 2020, more than two years after the tariffs’ original enactment. The
Supreme Court refused to hear the AIIS’s case after several other federal courts found
Trump’s steel tariff legal (Palmer 2020). So, according to the Supreme Court, the legal
justification for Trump’s steel tariff is perfectly valid. Underhanded and unorthodox?
Probably. But not technically illegal.

Within the Trump Administration
Although legal challenges against Trump’s emergency declaration failed, the
economic validity of Trump’s actions was challenged by many, including some of
Trump’s economic advisors and cabinet members (Kim 2020). This criticism, especially since it came straight from the Department of Defense, illustrates how illegitimate Trump’s “national security emergency” truly was related to steel. The Department of Defense even released a statement saying that their steel needs would not be
threatened by any international withholding of steel (Kim 2020). According to their
report, the Department of Defense only needs about 325,000 tons of steel and steel
products a year, which comes out to a whopping .3% of the US’s DOMESTIC steel
output (Packard 2018).
Opposition was strong even within Trump’s cabinet and administration. Gary
Cohn, the chief White House economic advisor at the time, had organized meetings
with industry leaders that relied heavily on steel to dissuade Trump from enacting
his tariff. Still, Trump refused to show up, canceling the meetings outright (Mangan
and Pramuk 2018). After Trump officially enacted the steel tariff, Cohn resigned from
his position. Cohn was a free-trade advocate and successful executive at Goldman
Sachs, and his departure cast a grim shadow over Trump’s impending protectionist
policy (Mangan and Pramuk 2018). Secretary of Defense James Mattis also opposed
the tariffs, arguing that the “use of unfair trade practices to intentionally erode our innovation and manufacturing” (Mattis 2017) is a greater threat to our national security
than foreign steel. Mattis would eventually resign from his position later in 2018 over
President Trump’s military policy in Syria (Goldberg 2020).
Most of the remaining secretaries shared similar sentiments. One unnamed official reported the divide as 22 against the tariff versus 3 for, “but since one of the
three is named Donald Trump, it was case closed” (Allen and Swan 2017). Commerce
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Secretary Ross, National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro, and Chief White
House Strategist Stephen Bannon were some of the few people other than the president in favor of the tariffs (Allen and Swan 2017).
As illustrated in this segment, opposition towards Trump’s steel tariff within the
government was strong and bipartisan before and after the tariff’s enactment. Yet,
Trump leveraged his presidential power in unconventional/unpopular ways to get
what he wanted, members of Congress and cabinet members be damned. President
Trump was the singular core political actor that drove this decision. The power that
his use of Section 232 granted him allowed him to act independently of anyone who
disagreed with him.

Interest Groups
While Trump’s motives in pushing his steel tariff might have been more ideological than directly related to the steel industry, the interest groups and other third
parties that worked tirelessly to sway him had only their economic interests at heart.
First and foremost in these tariff-supporting groups are numerous domestic steel
companies and groups, such as the American Institute for Iron and Steel, and Nucor
Corporation. These groups invested heavily in lobbying as soon as Trump became
president, increasing their spending from 8.25 million dollars in 2016 to 12.18 million
in late 2017 (Mauldin 2019). The Nucor Corporation, the largest domestic producer of
steel in the US, contributed 2.7 million to that lobbying total and have gone on public
record directly lobbying for the nomination of Commerce Undersecretary Gilbert Kaplan and Jeffrey Gerrish (Nucor 2018). Also, Nucor contributed to President Trump’s
2016 campaign (Mauldin 2019). The steel industry’s interests in protective tariffs originate from the increasing competitiveness of foreign steel firms in the last 20 years.
America’s top steel producer, Nucor, is now number 14 on the list of the world’s top
steel producers (World Steel Association 2019). Other countries produce more steel
and sell it at lower prices thanks to their lower wages (World Steel Association 2019).
By gaining protection, domestic steel companies would be able to reclaim sections of
the US steel market lost to foreign steel firms.
The steel industry’s lobbying efforts were largely successful because they directly accessed President Trump from within his administration. Key members of
Trump’s cabinet and advisors, such as Secretary Ross, Representative Navarro, and
other close associates, had deep ties to the American steel industry (Timiraos and
Ballhaus 2018). Secretary Ross, who initiated the Department of Commerce’s investigation, served as co-founder and CEO of the International Steel Group and served
on the board of ArcelorMittal (the largest supplier of steel worldwide) directly before
becoming Secretary of Commerce (Timiraos and Ballhaus 2018). Peter Navarro had
tight connections to the steel industry, working closely with the Nucor Corporation
to produce a pro-American steel documentary, “Death By China” (Timiraos and Ballhaus 2018). Pro-US steel pressure combined with Trump’s pre-existing fixation on
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China made it easy for his advisors to convince the President that China’s burgeoning
steel industry was a threat to US interests.
The steel industry’s influence in this steel tariff is also evident in the amount of
power domestic steel companies held in deciding which companies were granted exemptions. Individual companies could apply for exemptions from the tariff on a caseby-case basis, and they had to be approved by the Department of Commerce (Lardner
and Fenn 2019). However, the Commerce Department makes these requests public
and allows any third party (often domestic steel companies) to make objections to
any request (Lardner and Fenn 2019). The Commerce Department found itself unprepared for the huge volume of requests they would receive and struggled to give each
one sufficient time. Bernd Janzen, a partner in Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP,
a group that worked closely with both the Department of Commerce and companies seeking exemptions, described the Department of Commerce as “hard-pressed
to spend more than a few minutes reviewing each application” (Janzen 2018). The
Department of Commerce would often deny companies’ exemption if there were any
objections without investigating it fully (Hampton 2018). By taking advantage of this
chaos, domestic steel companies often got their competitors’ exemption requests denied, crippling their competition. In contrast, domestic companies and their friends
enjoyed duty-free imports (Hampton 2018).
Additionally, labor unions like the AFL-CIO voiced their support for this steel
tariff, with the AFL’s president Trumka calling the tariff “critical to leveling the
playing field” (Trumka 2018). However, the AFL qualified their support, clarifying
that while they approved of punitive measures against China and other countries
who had “broken the rules” (Trumka 2018), they did not approve of Trump’s tariffs
against our allies like Canada and the EU. “I don’t think that Canada has violated the
rules,” said AFL president Trumka (Trumka 2018).
On the other hand, nearly every industry that involves steel as an input strongly
opposed this tariff: Light and heavy manufacturing, automakers, defense contractors, construction companies, you name it (American Retailer’s Association 2019).
Even farming groups got involved. Steel is an important component in most modern
farming equipment, and as such, Trump’s tariff hit farmers (Polansek 2018). Both
grain and meat farmers were negatively hit, and their respective associations voiced
their displeasure. Groups like the National Association of Egg Farmers, the US Apple
Association, and the National Renderer’s Association all lobbied Congress members
from areas where farming was prominent to try and alleviate soaring steel prices
(Polansek 2018). Farming groups were also concerned about the possibility of retaliatory tariffs targeting agriculture (Polansek 2018). Three of the countries targeted by
the steel tariff, Canada, Mexico, and the EU, were vital markets for US grain and agriculture, and by attacking them with tariffs, Trump invited them to retaliate against
US agriculture, which they did (Polansek 2018). US Grain Council President Tom
Sleight lamented this situation, “These countries are among our closest neighbors
and friends. We have spent years building markets in these countries based on a
mutual belief that increasing trade benefits all parties” (Sleight 2018). With this tariff,
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Sleight and others saw years of international cooperation undone before their eyes
and felt powerless as their efforts to sway Trump were largely fruitless (Polansek
2018). These farming and manufacturing groups primarily influenced members of
Congress, such as the Senate Agriculture Chairman, Pat Roberts (R-KS) (Schor 2018).
Another prominent US manufacturing sector, the auto industry, was strongly
affected by steel tariffs. Steel and other metals are vital components in nearly every
aspect of automobiles, and US automakers suddenly found their inputs shooting up
in price. These automakers faced a choice: raise their prices to compensate for the
tariffs or eat the increased costs themselves. In many cases, smaller automakers that
couldn’t effectively absorb price increases had to shut down entirely (Carey 2019). By
enacting tariffs to support one struggling US industry (steel), Trump harmed many
other already struggling industries like the auto industry, pushing many firms to
either move offshore or close entirely (Carey 2019).
A year after the tariff’s initial passage, 49 industry groups wrote Secretary of
Commerce Ross and Trade Representative Lighthizer begging them to do what they
could to get the tariff lifted. Some of these groups included the Agricultural Retailers
Association, the North America Meat Institute, the National Tooling and Machining
Association, and many other groups adversely affected by steel’s increase in price
due to the tariff (American Retailer’s Association 2019). Although this letter was written after the tariff’s initial passage, we can infer these groups also opposed the tariff
before its implementation.
These oppositional efforts were largely ineffective because they lacked the same
direct connection to the president that steel groups could achieve. Instead of convincing Trump, the main political actor who mattered in the decision, these oppositional
groups instead lobbied their congressmen and congresswomen. While that has certainly been effective in the past, Congress’s collective action problems and bureaucratic red tape rendered any lobbying within Congress to be mostly impotent. The
letter previously mentioned was written directly to Secretary of Commerce Ross and
Trade Representative Lighthizer, two of the tariffs’ biggest proponents (American
Retailer’s Association 2019). Considering these two men’s position on the tariff, it is
no wonder that these grievances fell on deaf ears.
In summary, the climate surrounding societal groups was much like that in the
government, with only the parties that would directly benefit from steel tariffs being for Trump’s tariff, while every industry reliant on steel (most of manufacturing,
machinery, automaking, etc.) coming out strongly against them. So why was the steel
industry’s lobbying so effective, as opposed to other industries’ efforts? This can be
explained by, again, President Trump and his protectionist proclivities. Back in the
days of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, industries would have to band together to secure
votes in Congress, forming unlikely coalitions such as northern agriculture and light
manufacturing (Eichengreen 1989). In the 2018 scenario, however, the only person
that needed convincing was Donald Trump. This concentration of power explains
how the steel industry’s pointed lobbying was so successful, while the agriculture
and manufacturing sectors’ broad and Congress-oriented lobbying was not.
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Conclusion
As I have argued throughout this paper, Trump was the primary causal and
ideological actor in the establishment and execution of the 2018 steel tariffs. Having
been a protectionist for nearly his entire life, he had no qualms taxing steel imports,
even if there would be negative consequences both domestically and internationally
(Schleisinger 2018). However, his tariff would not have been possible without state
structures allowing the president to take executive action without Congressional approval under Section 232. State structures also kept other branches of government
like Congress from effectively mobilizing against what they saw as a vast overreach
of power, as Congress struggled and failed to overcome its own contentious and inefficient nature. Lobbying and other societal groups in favor of steel tariffs effectively
persuaded the president by taking advantage of close personal ties with many of
Trump’s aides and advisors, encouraging Trump’s protectionist philosophies. Other
societal groups that were negatively affected by the tariff, like manufacturing and agriculture, struggled to effectively impact the president as their Congress-based influence was rendered impotent by bureaucracy. Overall, while President Trump was the
ideological driving force and political actor behind this tariff, state structures played
a key role by providing him both the means to implement his tariff and by bogging
down Congressional opposition in committee meetings and other inefficient ways of
effecting change.
So what should the lesson be from this whole debacle? First and foremost, this
should reaffirm what every classical economist already knows: tariffs are inherently
inefficient, and by enacting them, we accept lower efficiency and general welfare as
a consequence. These tariffs also serve as an indictment of the recent neo-isolationist
movements gaining popularity in the US. Trading with other countries doesn’t mean
we are nott “putting the US first”: in fact, trading with other countries puts us closer
to that goal than using tariffs does. By openly trading with other countries, the US
ensures the lowest prices and the greatest benefits for its citizens. What better way is
there to “Make America Great Again” than to lower consumer prices, increase GDP
through cheaper input costs, and bolster our relationships with allies? By re-learning
the benefits of free trade, modern Republicans on Trump’s side of trade issues could
overcome the short-term allure of tariffs and move towards free-trade policies that
used to be one of the Republican party’s defining ideological tenets.
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